

DRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: COPS

Document No. 19 3 August 1948

FROM: TRS

NO CHANGE in Class. ☐☐ DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S (C)

SUBJECT: Technical Training

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

Date: 8 MAR 1978 By: [redacted]

25X1

1. Recent conversations with COPS and TRS have [redacted] Mr. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] and me to review our present programs and future plans for Technical Training. It is obvious that some of our training duplicates what is being done by COPS and TRS, equally obvious that much closer integration of Technical training, by whomever done, with Intelligence training is necessary.

2. Over the past year and a half, most of our efforts in TRS have been devoted to the development of a logical and effective program of intelligence training, both Staff and Covert. Though we intend to improve further this phase of training, we feel that we now have the kind of program of which we—and COPS—can be fairly proud. Our efforts during this coming year—subject to the world situation—will be shifted to working out better training in administration, in language and area studies, and, particularly, in the application of technical aids to operations—defensively and offensively. We therefore welcome the current concern over the status of Technical Training.

3. Discussion of Technical Training is sometimes difficult because no solid definition of what we mean by "Technical" has yet been agreed upon, however, I think I can describe our approach to "technical" matters in training and, thereby, perhaps arrive at a working understanding of what it is and what it is not.

4. In order to describe more accurately our approach to the technical aspects of our business, we in TRS have decided to call the training previously titled "Technical" "Counter-intelligence Training." Perhaps a title such as "Police Methods" or "Investigative Methods" would be as accurate. In any case

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

our approach has been and will be based on the premise that all OSO staff and covert personnel going overseas must live and operate on the assumption that all the techniques of modern investigative science will be thrown against them. Also, we must train some of our people either to use or to instruct others in these techniques. Within this group there are also those who need thorough familiarity with counter-intelligence techniques—namely, our OS men who will have close working relationships with the Security Agencies of other powers and, therefore, must be able to speak the investigative language and conduct the liaison by operational advice and supply.

5. If the above principles are sound then it is obvious that we are dealing with a complex of integrated techniques—not merely with individual gadgets. To illustrate what this means for defensive purposes: the OSO^{25X1} man overseas may be investigated. If so, he will be put under surveillance.



and the planting of CI people in the household of our man. It is our contention in SRS that all OSO people going overseas—and probably all in Washington assignments—should be sufficiently familiar with what we call the "pitfalls of security" to protect themselves—and OSO—from these CI techniques. We also believe that this defensive training should be given by men who understand the way in which these techniques are integrated and not by men who are experts on this or that gadget. In other words,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

knowledge of the hazards of our trade is as much a part of intelligence training as positive—or offensive—techniques.

6. If we apply this same principle of integrated techniques to the next level—those who need all-round familiarity for liaison or operational purposes, it is plain that such instruction should be handled by men who know the intelligence game and who also understand the complexity of counter-intelligence or investigative techniques. We believe that a proper training program for Intelligence Officers going overseas and for Division Chiefs and Case Officers in Washington should include thorough knowledge of the offensive capabilities of CI techniques, including the necessary tools or gadgets. Therefore we have been attempting increasingly to present lectures and devise problems to bring out these techniques—including technical surveillance.

7. A further level of knowledge of techniques properly falls within the province of S&S and the technical divisions of OSO. If a particular instrument is to be used for a particular operation, obviously the technician who developed the item should instruct in its workings and maintenance. Or, if high security is involved—as in certain secret writing methods—then again the instruction should be by the expert who knows the method.

8. If the above principles are accepted, no radical change in our present developing training program need be made; however, we should attempt to settle certain points where duplication seems to exist. There are certain types of instruction about which there is no question. T&S, for example, does not touch instruction in codes, ciphers, or W/T. For such training, T&S simply acts as the middle-man between the Foreign branches

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

and Communications. Similarly, we do not—except with express permission of
[] instruct in SW or in Document Intelligence. It should also be ^{25X1}
noted that [] and a representative of Communications deliver ^{25X1}
lectures in our Advanced Intelligence Course to explain their functions
and possible support to operations. However, we do appear to be duplicating

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2006/04/22 : CIA-RDP57-00012A000400100025-1

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

or briefing has been completed by CCD or CDD, an evaluation of his proficiency will be forwarded through TRS. Similarly, TRS will inform CCD or CDD of the level of proficiency achieved by any student turned over to CCD or CDD for advanced training or briefing in items of special equipment.

10. I believe that adoption of the above proposals will eliminate present duplication of effort in the counter-intelligence training program. However, because it has not yet been discussed, I should like to mention the fact that TRS has been giving instruction in self-defense - including weapons - and in [] these 25X1 do not fall precisely within the technical field, yet I would like some assurance that they belong under TRS. (As a matter of fact, TRS appears to have the only instructors who have a working knowledge of self-defense, weapons, and [] 25X1

11. Since we are currently attempting to revise the organization of TRS, as well as to plan future courses, I should like to have clarification on the functions of TRS in the "Technical" field as soon as possible. In order to achieve this, I suggest that this paper be routed to OPSO, DOPC, SES, CDD, and CCD. Then, I believe we should all get together and reach an agreement satisfactory to all of us.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~